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1 Introduction
Isabelle is a generic theorem prover, designed for interactive reasoning in a variety of
formal theories. At present it provides useful proof procedures for Constructive Type
Theory (Per Martin-LÄof, 1984), various ¯rst-order logics, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory,
and higher-order logic. This survey of Isabelle serves as an introduction to the rather
formidable literature.
Generic theorem proving may seem a foolish enterprise. When theorem proving for a
¯xed logic is already so di±cult, why complicate matters by letting the logic vary? The
answer is that many of the di±culties have to do with logic in general. These can be
dealt with once and for all, leaving the peculiarities of individual logics to be dealt with
separately. The resulting system may be far less powerful than a specialized theorem
prover, but will be more °exible. Many automatic systems force the user to work with a
¯xed search strategy as well as a ¯xed logic.
Isabelle embraces logics from a fairly broad family. Some members of the family are
constructive, others classical. They include ¯rst-order and higher-order logics. Some are
based on sets, others on types and functions, others on domains. The family is evolving:
new members are born, others develop and mature, and some disappear. As it is applied
to a particular problem, a logic becomes more and more specialized, and Isabelle accom-
modates this. Distant cousins, however, such as relevance and dynamic logics, may fall
outside Isabelle's scope. It may not be possible to accommodate everyone.
We shall start with a thorough history of Isabelle, beginning with its origins in lcf.
This is a tale of errors, not of a grand design. There follows an account of how logics
are represented, illustrated using classical logic. The approach is compared with the
Edinburgh Logical Framework. Several of the Isabelle object-logics are then presented,
and ¯nally the conclusions survey work in progress.
2 The LCF approach to theorem proving
First we should recall the history of lcf. Around 1972, Robin Milner developed a proof
checker for Scott's Logic for Computable Functions. His results led him to seek a com-
promise between fully automatic theorem proving, which seemed impossibly di±cult, and
single step proof checking, which seemed impossibly tedious. Around 1977, his group
developed a programmable proof checker, Edinburgh lcf. Inference rules were expressed
as functions in a programmable meta-language (called ml). By writing programs in ml,
users could automate the proof process as much as desired.
lcf also permits a proof to be constructed backwards from a goal, the conjecture to
be proved. An lcf tactic is a function that reduces a goal to zero or more subgoals.
Once all the subgoals have been solved, lcf (using complex bookkeeping) constructs the
corresponding forwards proof, yielding the desired theorem. Tacticals combine tactics
in various ways. Tactics and tacticals constitute a powerful control language; they can
describe search methods such as `repeatedly apply Rule X then repeatedly apply either
Rule Y or Rule Z'.
Edinburgh lcf proved a great success. Many similar systems were developed: including
Cambridge lcf (Paulson, 1987); Nuprl for Constructive Type Theory (Constable et al.,
1986); and hol for higher-order logic (Gordon, 1988).
In 1985 there were already two lcf-style theorem provers for Constructive Type The-
ory. In writing a third, I had speci¯c aims. One was to incorporate SokoÃlowski's (1987)
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technique for solving unknowns in goals by uni¯cation; this involved a complicated treat-
ment of variable assignments in tactics. Another aim was to write the entire system in
Standard ml | which had grown out of lcf's meta-language | to show it was a practical
alternative to Lisp. (For an introduction, see WikstrÄom (1987).) Another aim was to
experiment with de Bruijn's (1972) treatment of bound variables. The data structure was
Martin-LÄof's theory of expressions (similar to the typed λ-calculus), which seemed able to
represent most forms of logical syntax.
Making an lcf-style system was time-consuming and uncertain. Every year or so,
lcf users found some serious bug. (Most were due to bound variable clashes in strange
situations.) There was widespread concern that computer scientists could not implement
logics as fast as logicians could conceive them. The ideal solution seemed to be a generic
theorem prover for a broad class of logics. Realistically, the most one could aim to provide
was a standard library of syntactic operations. This would spare implementors from coding
tricky substitution functions, but they would still have to write a function and a tactic for
each inference rule.
3 Proof construction by uni¯cation
Uni¯cation has long been important in theorem proving. It seems essential for Con-
structive Type Theory, where we typically have to prove ?a ∈ A, where A represents a
proposition and ?a is an unknown. At the end of the proof, the meta-variable ?a must be
replaced by some proof object. A series of uni¯cations could construct this object step by
step.
But there is a snag. Although standard uni¯cation can easily be modi¯ed to cope with
bound variables, the Type Theory proof process builds λ-abstractions, and so uni¯cation
must instantiate function variables.
Unaware of this snag, I foolishly wrote a mountain of code, and it did not work. What
was required was higher-order uni¯cation: a special uni¯cation procedure for the typed
λ-calculus, with its bound variables and conversion rules. G¶erard Huet (1975) had already
designed such a procedure, and it had been successfully applied by Andrews et al. (1984).
A quick implementation showed that higher-order uni¯cation could perform the syntactic
operations of rules and tactics. An inference rule could be represented literally: as a list
of premises and a conclusion. The meta-variables in rules would be schematic variables
for higher-order uni¯cation. Proof construction would work by combining rules, unifying
the conclusion of one rule with a premise of another. This is the basic idea of Isabelle.
Higher-order uni¯cation has appalling theoretical properties: it is undecidable and the
set of solutions may be in¯nite. In practice, Huet's procedure works reliably. Perhaps
Isabelle uses only easy cases.
Quanti¯ers cause the main di±culties. Martin-LÄof (1984) showed how complicated
variable binding and substitution rules can be uniformly presented in (essentially) the
typed λ-calculus. But what about eigenvariables, the special variables in quanti¯er rules?
Consider the eigenvariable x in the rule
P [x]
∀x.P [x]
The eigenvariable proviso, `x not free in the hypotheses', can be enforced in numerous
ways. One idea was to replace x by a Skolem term (Paulson, 1986). A related idea,
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based on directed acyclic graphs, worked much better and led to the ¯rst usable version
of Isabelle. Now Isabelle uses yet another approach, described in Section 6.3.
4 Early experiments
At ¯rst Isabelle was horribly slow. In the worst example, solving trivial subgoals took
minutes of computer time. There was plainly much re-traversal of redundant subexpres-
sions. Complicated `structure sharing' techniques were tried without success. The cure
turned out to be simple: eliminate Skolem terms, the cause of the redundancy. Another
case of poor performance was ¯nally traced to a subtle heuristic defect in the uni¯cation
search procedure; the cure involved a single line of code.
Though e±ciency should not become an obsession, the program has to run fast enough
to be usable. The issues are the same as in conventional programming, and so are the
techniques. ml's execution pro¯ler reported that the sharing mechanism, meant to boost
e±ciency, was consuming most of the run time. The replacement of structure sharing by
copying made Isabelle simpler and faster. Complex algorithms are often the problem, not
the solution.
By 1986, Isabelle could accomplish automated proof using tactics and tacticals more
powerful than lcf's. There was no need to write a tactic for each rule since a standard
tactic applied any given rules to a goal. Goals could contain variables, even function
variables, to be solved by uni¯cation. If all this was not enough, the user always had
recourse to ml.
The 1986 version of Isabelle is called Isabelle-86 to distinguish it from the present
Isabelle, which uses a di®erent representation of rules (described in the next section). The
object-logics of Isabelle-86 can now be discussed.
For Constructive Type Theory many useful proof techniques are implemented, such as
type inference and term rewriting. Rewriting can be easily expressed in pure prolog |
it is just a form of equality reasoning. The same idea works for Constructive Type Theory,
where rewriting is used for many complicated proofs about arithmetic.
First-order logic is implemented in several versions. Thanks to a devious encoding
of lists as nested function applications, higher-order uni¯cation can achieve the e®ect
of associative uni¯cation (Huet and Lang, 1978). Thus we may formulate the sequent
calculus using sequence variables. For example, a basic sequent is one that has a formula
in common on the left and right sides; every basic sequent is obviously valid. A scheme
for basic sequents can be directly represented in Isabelle:
?¡, ?P, ?¡′ ` ?¢, ?P, ?¢′
Again, a question mark indicates a meta-variable. Note that a meta-variable in a goal
represents an unknown, while meta-variables in a rule express its schematic structure.
Here ?¡, ?¢, ?¡′, and ?¢′ denote sequences while ?P denotes a formula. Unifying
this scheme with the sequent Q(?a), Q(f(?b)) ` Q(f(1)) produces two uni¯ers: one with
?a = f(1) and one with ?b = 1. Each uni¯er gives a valid instance of the sequent. A naive
procedure of repeated rule application can prove moderately hard examples automatically:
about 35 of the problems in Pelletier (1986).
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory has been implemented over ¯rst-order logic. Set theory is
de¯ned through ¯rst-order axioms. These are used to derive a family of rules, forming a
sequent calculus for set theory. The resulting proof procedure can prove many interesting
facts.
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5 Extending the rule calculus
If the naive rule calculus could cope with the range of mathematical reasoning from Con-
structive Type Theory to Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, why consider more complex logical
frameworks? One problem was that Isabelle-86 did not support natural deduction. Each
logic had to be formulated as a sequent calculus with explicit rules for assumptions. In
practice, though, this seemed a minor problem.
The real puzzle was how best to support the use of derived rules. Derived rules
permitted working at an abstract level and produced shorter proofs. To prove a theorem
Isabelle-86 worked well; to derive a rule required reducing the conclusion to a given set
of premises, which was as simple as threading a needle with a piece of wet spaghetti.
The solution seemed to involve taking the desired premises as meta-level assumptions and
using them in the proof. A further complication: Constructive Type Theory required
taking rules as assumptions.
So the Isabelle-86 rule calculus needed a radical extension. In Schroeder-Heister's
(1984) `rules of higher level', a rule could discharge assumptions, and each assumption
could itself be a schematic rule. But there were extremely complicated discharge functions
and variable conditions. Unpublished work by Martin-LÄof developed similar concepts
using `propositions as types'; people at Edinburgh formalized these ideas as the Logical
Framework.
It is not di±cult to capture the same ideas in a framework better suited to Isabelle.
To the typed λ-calculus add implication and a typed universal quanti¯er with their usual
meanings. We obtain a meta-level inference system for proof construction, replacing the
old calculus of object-rules. Implication expresses logical entailment (including assumption
discharge) while the quanti¯er expresses generality (including eigenvariable conditions).
When rules are combined, assumptions and eigenvariables accumulate properly. The new
system is much better with derived rules, especially under natural deduction; these two
concepts appear to be closely related.
Isabelle's new meta-logic is the fragment of higher-order logic (Andrews, 1986) with
implication (=⇒), the universal quanti¯er (∧), and equality (≡). Non-standard symbols
are used to leave the standard symbols free for the object-logics. The type of propositions
(Church's type o) is called prop. None of the existing formalizations of logics require
quanti¯cation over prop, only quanti¯cation over object truth-values. There are philo-
sophical and technical reasons for prohibiting abstractions involving prop, staying within
predicative simple type theory. For a detailed discussion, see Paulson (1989).
The rules are shown to allow comparison with the Edinburgh Logical Framework.
Bear in mind this is not a new system but part of an old one (Church, 1940), expressed
in natural deduction style.
introduction elimination
[φ]
ψ
φ =⇒ ψ
φ =⇒ ψ φ
ψ
φ[x]∧
x.φ[x]
∗
∧
x.φ[x]
φ[t]
* Proviso: the variable x must not be free in the assumptions.
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Here φ[x] indicates that the formula φ may have free occurrences of x. In this context φ[t]
means the substitution of t for x in φ, subject to the usual conditions. The
∧
introduction
rule has an eigenvariable condition. In
∧
elimination, term t and variable x must have the
same type.
Isabelle-86 permits constants to be de¯ned, but the new meta-logic expresses de¯nitions
using meta-level equality (≡). The axiom C ≡ t de¯nes the constant C to equal the term
t. By the usual equality properties, we can replace C by t (or the reverse) in a proof. The
meta-logic includes the equality rules of the typed λ-calculus, such as substitution and α,
β, and η-conversion.
A logic is represented by introducing new types, constants, and axioms. The repre-
sentation can be viewed syntactically or semantically. In the syntactic viewpoint, certain
strings of symbols in the object-logic are mapped to strings of symbols in the meta-logic.
This viewpoint is convenient for proving formal properties of the representation, such as
soundness.
The semantic viewpoint observes that the meta-logic (higher-order logic) has simple
models. Each type denotes a set, each typed term denotes an element of the corresponding
set, and the logical constants have their usual meanings. If the object-logic also has a
semantics, then the representation in higher-order logic ought to preserve this semantics.
This point of view is helpful for informal mathematical reasoning. If the object-logic
uses a syntactic device that is awkward for the meta-logic, then it can be formalized
di®erently. Often such changes of formalization are `obviously' reasonable, though the
formal equivalence in the model theory could be di±cult to prove.
6 A formalization of ¯rst-order logic
As an example of the meta-logic, let us represent classical ¯rst-order logic. The following
is a standard natural deduction system (Prawitz, 1965), where ⊥ means falsity and ¬P
abbreviates P ⊃ ⊥.
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introduction elimination
P Q
P ∧Q
P ∧Q
P
P ∧Q
Q
P
P ∨Q
Q
P ∨Q
P ∨Q
[P ]
R
[Q]
R
R
[P ]
Q
P ⊃ Q
P ⊃ Q P
Q
[P ⊃ ⊥]
⊥
P
P [x]
∀x.P [x]∗
∀x.P [x]
P [t]
P [t]
∃x.P [x]
∃x.P [x]
[
P [x]
]
Q
Q
†
* Proviso: the variable x must not be free in the assumptions.
† Proviso: the variable x must not be free in Q or in any assumption save P [x]
6.1 The treatment of syntax
First-order logic deals with terms and formulae. To represent these in the typed λ-calculus,
we introduce types term and form and constant symbols for the connectives and quanti-
¯ers.
⊥ ∈ form
∧,∨,⊃ ∈ form → (form → form)
∀,∃ ∈ (term → form)→ form
Here ⊥ ∈ form means `⊥ has type form'. We will write ∧, ∨, ⊃ as in¯xes; note that they
are curried functions of two arguments. The types of ∀ and ∃ are explained below.
In the syntactic viewpoint, every meta-level term of type term encodes some ¯rst-order
term, and every meta-level term of type form encodes some formula. The logical constants
construct formulae: if P and Q are codings of formulae then so is P ∧ Q. Furthermore,
λ-abstraction encodes the use of bound variables in quanti¯ers: the encoding of ∀x.P [x]
is ∀(λx.P [x]).
To understand the representation of the rules we shall need the semantic viewpoint.
Type form denotes the set of truth values, {⊥,>}. The connectives ∧, ∨, ⊃ denote Boolean
functions de¯ned by truth tables. Type term denotes a non-empty set of individuals: in
8
¯rst-order logic, the universe is assumed to be non-empty. As it happens, all types denote
non-empty sets in Isabelle's version of higher-order logic.
The quanti¯ers ∀ and ∃ are in¯nitary versions of ∧ and ∨. Suppose P [x] has type form
where x has type term. If P [x] is true (equals >) for all x, then λx.P [x] is a function
on individuals that is constantly equal to >. In this case ∀(λx.P [x]) equals >. More
generally, ∀(F ) equals > if and only if F (x) equals > for all x. The existential quanti¯er
can similarly be interpreted using an in¯nite truth table to de¯ne ∃(F ).
Although object-level truth (type form) should be distinguished from meta-level truth
(type prop), they are related. The meta-level only needs to know whether a given value
in form is true. We could introduce the constant > and express `P is true' by P ≡ >, but
it is more general to introduce the meta-predicate that holds of all truths:
true : form → prop
Then `P is true' becomes true(P ), usually abbreviated as [[P ]]. Now for each object-level
rule we introduce an axiom.
6.2 The formalization of the rules
The conjunction rules are simple, and the corresponding axioms can be read by the obvious
syntactic translation. The semantic reading is also simple: `if P ∧Q is true then P is true',
and so forth. Note that =⇒ associates to the right; the parentheses just below could be
omitted. ∧
PQ . [[P ]] =⇒ ([[Q]] =⇒ [[P ∧Q]])∧
PQ . [[P ∧Q]] =⇒ [[P ]]
∧
PQ . [[P ∧Q]] =⇒ [[Q]]
For disjunction, the introduction rules are simple but the elimination rule discharges
assumptions. This is discussed below.∧
PQ . [[P ]] =⇒ [[P ∨Q]]
∧
PQ . [[Q]] =⇒ [[P ∨Q]]∧
PQR . [[P ∨Q]] =⇒ ([[P ]] =⇒ [[R]]) =⇒ ([[Q]] =⇒ [[R]]) =⇒ [[R]]
Now consider implication. The elimination rule is simple, while the introduction rule
discharges an assumption. The rationale for this rule is that if from assuming P it follows
that Q is true, then P ⊃ Q must be true. The axiom simply formalizes this in the meta-
logic, rendering both `it follows that' and `if-then' as meta-implications. Syntactically,
both rule application and assumption discharge are translated to =⇒.∧
PQ . ([[P ]] =⇒ [[Q]]) =⇒ [[P ⊃ Q]]∧
PQ . [[P ⊃ Q]] =⇒ ([[P ]] =⇒ [[Q]])
Together these axioms de¯ne [[P ⊃ Q]] as equivalent to [[P ]] =⇒ [[Q]].
If the contradiction rule is omitted, we have minimal logic. For intuitionistic logic we
could formalize a weak contradiction rule:∧
P . [[⊥]] =⇒ [[P ]]
The classical rule discharges the assumption ¬P :∧
P . ([[P ⊃ ⊥]] =⇒ [[⊥]]) =⇒ [[P ]]
Using Isabelle we can de¯ne minimal logic and then de¯ne intuitionistic and classical logic
as extensions of it. We cannot share theorem provers, however: most classical methods
are invalid for intuitionistic logic.
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6.3 Quantifier issues
Quanti¯er rules are traditionally expressed using a notation for substitution, as in P [t].
When the rules are formalized in Isabelle, the scope of the quanti¯er becomes a function
variable, say F . Substitution is obtained by function application: F (t). Syntactically, if
F is λx . P [x] then F (t) is (λx . P [x])(t), which is P [t] by β-conversion. Semantically, F is
a function from individuals to truth values.
Some quanti¯er rules refer to eigenvariables restricted to occur only in certain formulae.
Isabelle-86 represents such restrictions literally, using a directed graph. The usual data
structure for a formula is already a graph; the additional arcs connect the variable x to
the formulae where it may not appear, say Q and R. A variable instantiation introducing
an occurrence of x in Q or R would be detected as a cycle. Logicians may recognize that
in this approach, eigenvariables are essentially Henkin constants.
The new meta-logic requires no special mechanism for eigenvariables (Paulson, 1989).
The quanti¯er
∧
can express the generality intended by the syntactic restrictions. The
premise of ∀ introduction is general: that F (x) is true for arbitrary x. The corresponding
axiom expresses that ∀ is an in¯nitary conjunction, as discussed in Section 6.1.∧
F . (
∧
x . [[F (x)]]) =⇒ [[∀x.F (x)]]∧
Fy . [[∀x.F (x)]] =⇒ [[F (y)]]
Together these axioms de¯ne [[∀x.F (x)]] as equivalent to ∧x . [[F (x)]].
The ∃ introduction rule is straightforward. But ∃ elimination is the most complicated
rule of all, having a general premise that discharges an assumption. Let us verify the
axiom of ∃ elimination using the semantics. If ∃x.F (x) is true, then F (x) is true for some
value of x. Since F (x) implies Q for all x, indeed Q is true.∧
Fy . [[F (y)]] =⇒ [[∃x.F (x)]]∧
FQ . [[∃x.F (x)]] =⇒ (
∧
x . [[F (x)]] =⇒ [[Q]]) =⇒ [[Q]]
7 Soundness and completeness
Is the Isabelle representation of classical logic correct? Each axiom is sound with respect
to the truth-table semantics of the logical constants, but we can do better. There is a
syntactic, rule-by-rule translation between meta-proofs and object-proofs (indicated by
triangles below):
[[P1]] . . . [[Pm]]∖/
[[Q]]
⇀↽
P1 . . . Pm∖/
Q
The representation is sound if for every meta-proof there is a corresponding object-proof,
and complete if for every object-proof there is a corresponding meta-proof.
Completeness is easy to demonstrate. We translate object-proofs to meta-proofs by
induction on the size of the object-proof. Three cases are shown.
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If the last inference is ∨ introduction, instantiate the corresponding axiom to the
formulae p and q. Then use the induction hypothesis to prove [[p]].∧
PQ . [[P ]] =⇒ [[P ∨Q]]∧
Q . [[p]] =⇒ [[p ∨Q]]
[[p]] =⇒ [[p ∨ q]]
∖/
[[p]]
[[p ∨ q]]
If the last inference is ⊃ introduction, then the induction hypothesis yields a proof
of [[q]] from the assumption [[p]]. Discharging this assumption at the meta-level proves
[[p]] =⇒ [[q]].
∧
PQ . ([[P ]] =⇒ [[Q]]) =⇒ [[P ⊃ Q]]∧
Q . ([[p]] =⇒ [[Q]]) =⇒ [[p ⊃ Q]]
([[p]] =⇒ [[q]]) =⇒ [[p ⊃ q]]
[
[[p]]
]
∖/
[[q]]
[[p]] =⇒ [[q]]
[[p ⊃ q]]
For ∀ introduction, the scope of the quanti¯er (F ) is instantiated to some abstraction
λx.p[x]. Then the induction hypothesis proves [[ p[x] ]], since x is not free in the assump-
tions, and so the meta-rule for
∧
proves
∧
x . [[p]].
∧
F . (
∧
x . [[F (x)]]) =⇒ [[∀x.F (x)]]
(
∧
x . [[ p[x] ]]) =⇒ [[∀x.p[x]]]
∖/
[[ p[x] ]]∧
x . [[ p[x] ]]
[[∀x.p[x]]]
Observe that the object and meta-logics share the mechanisms for assumption dis-
charge and quanti¯er provisos.
Soundness holds because every occurrence of an axiom in a meta-proof must take the
form illustrated in the three cases above. By a standard result of proof theory (Prawitz,
1965), every meta-proof can be put into extended normal form, consisting of a branch
rising to the left and terminating in an axiom. Subproofs have the same structure. A
recursive process translates the meta-proof to a corresponding object-proof.
My soundness argument is presented for intuitionistic ¯rst-order logic (Paulson, 1989).
It appears valid for all similar logics, just the ones that are easy to formalize in Isabelle.
Problematical logics (for example, modal) require separate demonstrations of soundness.
8 The Edinburgh Logical Framework
Inevitably we must compare Isabelle with the Edinburgh Logical Framework, or lf (Harper
et al., 1987). The two meta-logics have much in common, but Isabelle deals only with
provability, while the lf formalizes the object-proofs themselves.
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8.1 Propositions as types
The lf is closely related to a formal system of Per Martin-LÄof that is based on the idea
of propositions as types. This makes use of the general product type. If A is a type and
B[x] is a type for all x ∈ A then the type ∏x∈AB[x] is the product of B[x] over A. Its
elements are all functions f such that if a ∈ A then f(a) ∈ B[a].
Here are the introduction and elimination rules for ¦:
[x ∈ A]
b[x] ∈ B[x]
λx∈Ab[x] ∈ ∏x∈AB[x] ∗ f ∈
∏
x∈AB[x] a ∈ A
f(a) ∈ B[a]
* Proviso: the variable x must not be free in the assumptions save x ∈ A.
The introduction rule says, if b[x] ∈ B[x] for all x ∈ A then the function λx∈Ab[x] is an
element of
∏
x∈AB[x]. It is sometimes called a dependent function since the type of the
result may depend on the value of the argument. Strictly speaking, the introduction rule
also requires that A is a type, for with indexed families of types it may not be obvious
whether a type is well-formed.
If the type B does not depend on x then
∏
x∈AB[x] is abbreviated A → B, the type
of ordinary functions from A to B. In this case the rules simplify to
[x ∈ A]
b[x] ∈ B
λx∈Ab[x] ∈ A→ B ∗
f ∈ A→ B a ∈ A
f(a) ∈ B
The function types A → B generate the simple types of Isabelle. We furthermore
can interpret Isabelle's meta-logic using `propositions as types'. Each proposition φ is
interpreted by a set of proof terms for φ, following the intuitionistic reading of the logical
constants. (See NordstrÄom and Smith (1984) for a discussion.) Here only implication
(=⇒) and universal quanti¯cation (∧) must be considered.
A proof of φ =⇒ ψ is a function that maps proofs of φ to proofs of ψ. If A is the type
of φ proofs and B is the type of ψ proofs then A→ B is the type of φ =⇒ ψ proofs.
A proof of
∧
x . ψ[x], where x ∈ A, is a function that maps each a ∈ A to a proof of
ψ[a]. If B[x] is the type of ψ[x] proofs for x ∈ A then ∏x∈AB[x] is the type of ∧x . ψ[x]
proofs.
This interpretation, based on semantic ideas, is re°ected in the syntax of the rules.
Compare them with those of Section 5. Ignoring the elements of the types, which represent
proof terms, the → rules resemble the =⇒ rules. If we treat A as an ordinary type, the
¦ rules also resemble the
∧
rules. The type constraints for x are implicit in the
∧
rules,
but explicit in the ¦ rules.
8.2 First-order logic in the LF
We now formalize ¯rst-order logic in the lf for comparison with Isabelle's approach.
We introduce types term and form and the logical constants, as before. But we do
not have true ∈ form → prop. There is no type of propositions since here propositions
themselves are types. Instead, introduce a type-valued function `true' such that true(P )
is a type for all P ∈ form. Let us continue to abbreviate true(P ) as [[P ]], remembering
this is now a type.
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It is time to formalize the rules. Where Isabelle uses axioms to assert that a formula
P is true, the lf uses constants to construct elements of type [[P ]]. Recall the Isabelle
axioms for ∧ introduction, ⊃ introduction, and ∀ introduction:∧
PQ . [[P ]] =⇒ ([[Q]] =⇒ [[P ∧Q]])∧
PQ . ([[P ]] =⇒ [[Q]]) =⇒ [[P ⊃ Q]]∧
F . (
∧
x . [[F (x)]]) =⇒ [[∀x.F (x)]]
The corresponding constant declarations are
conjI ∈
∏
P∈form
∏
Q∈form
[[P ]]→ ([[Q]]→ [[P ∧Q]])
impI ∈
∏
P∈form
∏
Q∈form
([[P ]]→ [[Q]])→ [[P ⊃ Q]]
allI ∈
∏
F∈term→form
( ∏
x∈term
[[F (x)]]
)
→ [[∀x.F (x)]]
Now let us look at proof construction.
There is a constant for every object-rule, so each derivation produces a term formalizing
the object-proof. If proofp is a proof of p and proofq is a proof of q then conjI yields a
proof of p ∧ q. Note that conjI must be applied to p and q themselves, as well as their
proofs. Applying ¦ elimination four times derives
p ∈ form q ∈ form proofp ∈ [[p]] proofq ∈ [[q]]
conjI(p)(q)(proofp)(proofq) ∈ [[p ∧ q]]
The ⊃ introduction rule discharges an assumption. If proofr[z] is a proof of r, where
z ranges over proofs of p, we can construct a function from [[p]] to [[r]]:[
z ∈ [[p]]
]
proofr[z] ∈ [[r]]
λz∈[[p]]proofr[z] ∈ [[p]]→ [[r]]
Applying impI to p, r, and this function yields a proof of p ⊃ r:
p ∈ form r ∈ form
[
z ∈ [[p]]
]
proofr[z] ∈ [[r]]
impI(p)(r)(λz∈[[p]]proofr[z]) ∈ [[p ⊃ r]]
For an example of quanti¯ers, consider ∀ introduction. Let h[x] be a formula whose
proof is proofh[x] for x ∈ term. Apply → introduction to form the scope of the quanti¯er
and ¦ introduction to form a proof function:
[x ∈ term]
h[x] ∈ form
λx∈termh[x] ∈ term → form
[x ∈ term]
proofh[x] ∈ [[h[x] ]]
λx∈termproofh[z] ∈
∏
x∈term [[h[x] ]]
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Combining these meta-proofs yields
allI(λx∈termh[x])(λx∈termproofh[z]) ∈ [[∀x . h[x]]]
We now consider a complete, if trivial, proof of the tautology P ⊃ (P ∧ P ):
[P ] [P ]
P ∧ P
P ⊃ (P ∧ P )
The proof term is
impI(P )(P ∧ P )
(
λz∈[[P ]]conjI(P )(P )(z)(z)
)
∈ [[P ⊃ (P ∧ P )]]
Note that it contains 6 copies of P . Proof objects contain an enormous amount of redun-
dancy: just like ordinary `proof trees'.
8.3 Observations
Should we theorize ¯rst and code later, or vice versa? Isabelle is a computer program,
now several years old. It was ¯rst based on elementary ideas. These have now been
more formally developed. The lf is a theoretical system for which implementations are
emerging.
The main di®erence between Isabelle's meta-logic and the lf are the proof terms.
Because of storage limitations, the ¯rst practical applications of the lf will probably be
proof editors and checkers, where only small proofs are involved. Isabelle is intended for
large, semi-automatic proofs. It constructs proof objects only when, as in Constructive
Type Theory, they are explicitly present in the logic.
The essence of Martin-LÄof's approach is contained in the two ¦ rules. The Edinburgh
lf appears to be a much larger system: Harper et al. (1987) present 17 rules. The extra
rules formalize mundane aspects of the representation of a logic. For example, recall that
`true' is a type-valued function. To express such things, the lf has supertypes, called
Kinds. The Kind Type has all types as elements, while the Kind form → Type contains
functions from type form to types. In the lf, we would declare true ∈ form → Type. Other
lf rules construct signatures: sequences of constant declarations that de¯ne a logic.
Judging by the literature, these extended type theories do not seem to have useful,
intuitive models. Martin-LÄof uses an informal semantics. The lf researchers abandon the
semantical viewpoint altogether, regarding the formulation of a logic as a purely syntactic
coding.
Isabelle and the lf appear to deal with the same class of logics. An Isabelle represen-
tation (in higher-order logic) can be translated into the lf as sketched above, while Felty
and Miller (1988) describe the reverse translation. Avron et al. (1987) have formalized a
variety of logics. An lf representation is often more elegant, while Isabelle bene¯ts from
the large body of knowledge about higher-order logic.
9 Automated Proof in Isabelle
Isabelle supports automated proof through tactics and tacticals which | although imple-
mented in a completely new way | resemble those of Edinburgh lcf and its descendants.
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To compare Isabelle's representation of rules with lcf's, consider prolog. prolog
has no functions, only relations; many relations are truly bidirectional, having no distinc-
tion between input and output. Similarly Isabelle rules have no inputs or outputs; they
describe a relationship between premises and conclusion that must hold in a valid proof.
A rule, with its premises and conclusion, has the same basic structure as a Horn clause in
prolog.
There are di®erent styles of constructing the proof tree: forwards proof works from
the leaves downwards; backwards proof works from the root upwards. The lcf view of
rules | as functions from premises to conclusion | is biased towards forwards proof. By
adopting a bidirectional view of rules we get a simpler treatment of backwards proof.
Isabelle represents object-rules with assertions of the general form
[φ1, . . . , φm] =⇒ φ
Observe that this assertion has two valid readings:
• the rule with premises φ1, . . . , φm and conclusion φ
• the proof state with subgoals φ1, . . . , φm and ¯nal goal φ
The latter reading is that the subgoals φ1, . . . , φm are su±cient to achieve the ¯nal goal φ.
The initial state is typically the trivial implication [[P ]] =⇒ [[P ]]: here the goal is to prove
the formula P , and the one subgoal is the same. If we eventually reduce the proof state to
[[P ]], then the backwards proof is successful | and the desired theorem is the proof state
itself. The state of most theorem provers is hidden in the data structures, but Isabelle's
proof state is itself subject to the reasoning process.
Rules are essentially Horn clauses. We build proofs by combining two rules, and this
is simply Horn clause resolution. Let [ψ1, . . . , ψm] =⇒ ψ and [φ1, . . . , φn] =⇒ φ be Horn
clauses. Let s be any (higher-order) uni¯er of ψ and φi. Writing Xs for the application
of substitution s to the expression X, resolution is the following meta-inference:
[ψ1, . . . , ψm] =⇒ ψ [φ1, . . . , φn] =⇒ φ
[φ1, . . . , φi−1, ψ1, . . . , ψm, φi+1, . . . , φn]s =⇒ φs (ψs = φis)
Typically [ψ1, . . . , ψm] =⇒ ψ is an object-rule, while [φ1, . . . , φn] =⇒ φ is the proof state.
The result is the new proof state with the ith subgoal replaced by ψ1s, . . . , ψms. Substitu-
tion s updates variables in the object-rule, producing the correct instance to apply. It also
may update variables in the proof state, solving unknowns in other subgoals and the main
goal φ. Since the proof state is an assertion, the role of variables is easy to understand
and the e®ect of an update is immediately visible.
While lcf systems have a tactic for each rule, resolution is a uniform method of
inference. The standard tactic resolve_tac applies a list of rules to a subgoal. lcf
tacticals provide sequencing, choice, repetition of tactics. Similar control structures are
easily obtained for Isabelle tactics, even though they work on di®erent principles. Most
of these tactics and tacticals are independent of the object-logic, which means they are
available to all.
The Isabelle notion of tactic allows for an in¯nite sequence of results, for there may be
in¯nitely many higher-order uni¯ers in resolution. Multiple results are a useful generaliza-
tion that could be applied in lcf. They makes it easy to write tacticals that repeatedly
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apply some tactic and produce a search tree. One standard tactical uses a depth-¯rst strat-
egy, another best-¯rst. The tacticals return an in¯nite sequence of success nodes. In¯nite
lazy lists are implemented by the standard closure trick (Paulson, 1987, page 188).
The joining of rules should form a proof, but Isabelle discards the internal structure.
Thus the joining of rules derives a new rule. Derived rules can be used exactly like
primitive rules | and with the same e±ciency. They play an important role in many
logics, particularly in set theory, where an entire sequent calculus is derived from the
axioms.
Let us return to the example, classical logic. We cannot stop with formalizing the rules
and expect the hapless user to be able to prove theorems. Natural deduction is notoriously
awkward for classical logic; for starters, try proving P ∨ ¬P .
Classical proof is much easier with the help of derived rules such as the following
(Paulson, 1987, pages 46{49):
[¬Q]
P
P ∨Q
P ⊃ Q
[¬P ]
R
[Q]
R
R
¬P
[¬Q]
P
Q
The ¯rst two of these exploit the classical equivalence of P ⊃ Q and ¬P ∨ Q. The third
rule is the swap rule. It is typically applied to an assumption ¬P , where P is a complex
formula, creating a subgoal where P can be broken up using introduction rules.
Such derived rules simulate the sequent calculus lk (Takeuti, 1987), where a sequent
P1, . . . , Pm ` Q1, . . . , Qn can have more than one formula on the right. Why not use lk
directly? Indeed I have used lk extensively in Isabelle, but have come to prefer the clumsy
treatment shown above. Natural deduction seems to work better because it relies on the
standard implication (=⇒). The sequent calculus de¯nes another kind of implication (`),
and the manipulation of sequents involves a lot of extra work.
Either formalization leads to a complete automatic theorem prover. While much slower
than standard classical provers, they are fast enough for interactive use, and they are
°exible. They are a useful tool for stronger logics like arithmetic and set theory, in proofs
by induction.
The original (Isabelle-86) meta-logic is tailor-made for resolution, for rules look like
Horn clauses. The switch to higher-order logic has introduced some complications (Paul-
son, 1989). The axioms that represent object-rules are stripped of their outer quanti¯ers,
leaving implications. A subgoal formula may have a context of assumptions and eigenvari-
ables, meaning it may be enclosed by several occurrences of =⇒ and ∧. An object-rule is
automatically `lifted' into this context before it is applied.
These forms of meta-reasoning are derivable within higher-order logic but are hand-
coded in Isabelle for speed. The translation of object-proofs into higher-order logic makes
them 3{8 times bigger; resolution takes the expansion factor back down to one.
Felty and Miller (1988) formalize logics and theorem provers in λProlog, a version of
Prolog that uses higher-order uni¯cation. The logical basis of λProlog is extremely close
to Isabelle's, and rules are represented as λProlog clauses. The main di®erence is that
tactics are also written in λProlog, not ml.
10 Some Isabelle object logics
Now it is time for a close look at some implemented Isabelle logics: intuitionistic logic,
Constructive Type Theory, a classical sequent calculus, and set theory. A recent imple-
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mentation of higher-order logic will be described in a future paper.
The concrete syntax of a logic is speci¯ed by writing parsing and printing functions in
ml. Here is the computer syntax of the meta-logic symbols.∧
xy. is !(x,y)
=⇒ is ==>
≡ is ==
Constant and type declarations are omitted. When reading the rules, assume that any
one-letter identi¯er is a variable. For more details, see the User's Manual (Paulson, 1988).
10.1 Intuitionistic logic with natural deduction
The theory NJ implements intuitionistic ¯rst-order logic (Prawitz, 1965). Natural deduc-
tion involves a combination of forwards and backwards reasoning, particularly with the
elimination rules for ∧, ⊃, and ∀. Alternative forms of these are derived. This yields a logic
similar to Gentzen's lj, a cut-free sequent calculus suited to automatic proof (Takeuti,
1987).
Here are the rules for conjunction, disjunction, and implication:
[| P |] ==> [| Q |] ==> [| P&Q |]
[| P&Q |] ==> [| P |] [| P&Q |] ==> [| Q |]
[| P |] ==> [| P|Q |] [| Q |] ==> [| P|Q |]
[| P|Q |] ==> ([| P |] ==> [| R |]) ==>
([| Q |] ==> [| R |]) ==> [| R |]
([| P |] ==> [| Q |]) ==> [| P-->Q |]
[| P-->Q |] ==> [| P |] ==> [| Q |]
Here is how we de¯ne P ↔ Q in terms of conjunction and implication. Abstract rules
for ↔ can then be derived and used as though they were primitive.
P<->Q == (P-->Q) & (Q-->P)
Here are the quanti¯er rules.
(!(y) [| P(y) |]) ==> [| ALL x.P(x) |]
[| ALL x.P(x) |] ==> [| P(a) |]
[| P(a) |] ==> [| EXISTS x.P(x) |]
[| EXISTS x.P(x) |] ==> (!(y)[| P(y) |] ==> [| R |]) ==> [| R |]
This logic is distributed with about 75 sample theorems. Most, including the following,
are proved by an automatic tactic.
[| (~ ~ P) & ~ ~ (P --> Q) --> (~ ~ Q) |]
[| (EXISTS x. EXISTS y. P(x) & Q(x,y))
<-> (EXISTS x. P(x) & EXISTS y. Q(x,y)) |]
[| (EXISTS y. ALL x. P(x) --> Q(x,y))
--> ALL x. P(x) --> EXISTS y. Q(x,y) |]
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10.2 Constructive Type Theory
Isabelle formulates an extensional version of Martin-LÄof Type Theory using natural de-
duction. A typical judgement is expressed using
∧
and =⇒:∧
x1 . [[x1 ∈ A1]] =⇒∧x2 . [[x2 ∈ A2(x1)]] =⇒ · · · ∧xn . [[xn ∈ An(x1, . . . , xn−1)]]
=⇒ [[a(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ A(x1, . . . , xn)]]
Assumptions can use all the judgement forms, not just x ∈ A, and can even express that
B is a family of types over A:∧
x . [[x ∈ A]] =⇒ [[B(x) type]]
Here are some rules for the sum of two types, A + B, namely a formation rule, an
introduction rule, an elimination rule, and an equality (computation) rule.
[| A type |] ==> [| B type |] ==> [| A+B type |]
[| a: A |] ==> [| B type |] ==> [| inl(a): A+B |]
[| p: A+B |] ==> (!(x)[| x: A |] ==> [| c(x): C(inl(x)) |]) ==>
(!(y)[| y: B |] ==> [| d(y): C(inr(y)) |]) ==>
[| when(p,c,d): C(p) |]
[| a: A |] ==> (!(x)[| x: A |] ==> [| c(x): C(inl(x)) |]) ==>
(!(y)[| y: B |] ==> [| d(y): C(inr(y)) |]) ==>
[| when(inl(a),c,d) = c(a): C(inl(a)) |]
Here are some of the rules for the general product,
∏
x∈AB(x).
[| A type |] ==> (!(w)[| w: A |] ==> [| B(w) type |]) ==>
[| Prod(A,B) type |]
[| A type |] ==> (!(w)[| w: A |] ==> [| b(w): B(w) |]) ==>
[| lambda(b): Prod(A,B) |]
[| p: Prod(A,B) |] ==> [| a: A |] ==> [| p ` a: B(a) |]
[| a: A |] ==> (!(w)[| w: A |] ==> [| b(w): B(w) |]) ==>
[| lambda(b) ` a = b(a): B(a) |]
Constructive Type Theory is distributed with about 100 sample theorems. Tactics
based on those of NJ can automatically prove many logical statements expressed using
propositions as types. In the two examples below the goal contains the variable ?a standing
for some proof object. Isabelle instantiates this variable.
The ¯rst example is the derivation of a currying functional. The argument of the
functional is a function that maps z : §(A,B) to C(z); the resulting function maps x ∈ A
and y ∈ B(x) to C(〈x, y〉). Here is the initial goal; B is a family over A while C is a family
over §(A,B).
[| A type |] ==>
(!(x)[| x:A |] ==> [| B(x) type |]) ==>
(!(z)[| z: (SUM x:A . B(x)) |] ==> [| C(z) type |]) ==>
[| ?a: (PROD z: (SUM x:A . B(x)) . C(z))
--> (PROD x:A . PROD y:B(x) . C(<x,y>)) |]
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This goal is proved in one step by an automatic tactic, replacing ?a by the currying
functional
lam ka. lam kb. lam kc. ka ` <kb,kc>
The second example is a strong choice principle (Martin-LÄof, 1984, page 50). The
proof requires a complicated series of commands. The initial goal is
[| A type |] ==>
(!(x)[| x:A |] ==> [| B(x) type |]) ==>
(!(x,y)[| x:A |] ==> [| y:B(x) |] ==> [| C(x,y) type |]) ==>
[| ?a: (PROD x:A. SUM y:B(x). C(x,y))
--> (SUM f: (PROD x:A. B(x)). PROD x:A. C(x, f`x)) |]
By the end of the proof, ?a has become
lam ka. <lam u. fst(ka`u), lam kb. snd(ka`kb)>
Another collection of examples develops elementary arithmetic. Theorems include
m+n = n+m, m×n = n×m, (m+n)×k = m×k+n×k, and (m×n)×k = m×(n×k),
culminating in
m mod n+ (m/n)× n = m
10.3 Classical first-order logic
The theory LK implements classical ¯rst-order logic using the sequent calculus. Assertions
have the form ¡ ` ¢, where ¡ and ¢ are lists of formulae. A dollar sign pre¯x ($) indicates
a sequence variable.
Here are some structural rules: basic sequents, thinning, and cut.
[| $H, P, $G |- $E, P, $F |]
[| $H |- $E, $F |] ==> [| $H |- $E, P, $F |]
[| $H |- $E, P |] ==> [| $H, P |- $E |] ==> [| $H |- $E |]
These are the rules for conjunction and negation:
[| $H |- $E, P, $F |] ==> [| $H |- $E, Q, $F |] ==>
[| $H |- $E, P&Q, $F |]
[| $H, P, Q, $G |- $E |] ==> [| $H, P&Q, $G |- $E |]
[| $H, P |- $E, $F |] ==> [| $H |- $E, ~P, $F |]
[| $H, $G |- $E, P |] ==> [| $H, ~P, $G |- $E |]
These are the rules for the universal quanti¯er:
(!(x)[| $H |- $E, P(x), $F |]) ==> [| $H |- $E, Forall(P), $F |]
[| $H, P(a), $G, Forall(P) |- $E |] ==>
[| $H, Forall(P), $G |- $E |]
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Around 75 examples are distributed. Most, like these, are proved automatically.
[| H |- (ALL x. ALL y. EXISTS z. ALL w.(P(x)&Q(y)-->R(z)&S(w)))
--> (EXISTS x. EXISTS y. P(x) & Q(y)) --> EXISTS z.R(z) |]
[| EXISTS x. P(x) & ~Q(x),
ALL x. P(x) --> R(x),
ALL x. M(x) & L(x) --> P(x),
(EXISTS x. R(x) & ~ Q(x)) --> (ALL x. L(x) --> ~ R(x))
|- ALL x. M(x) --> ~L(x) |]
10.4 Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory
The theory called set implements Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory over LK.
The following are unusual de¯nitions where one formula is de¯ned as equal to another.
The extensionality axiom states that A = B is equivalent to A ⊆ B ∧ B ⊆ A. The
power set axiom states that A ∈ Pow(B) is equivalent to A ⊆ B. They could instead be
expressed using `if and only if' (↔).
A<=B == ALL x. x:A --> x:B
A=B == A<=B & B<=A
a: (b::B) == a=b | a:B
A: Pow(B) == A<=B
The constant :: satis¯es a :: B = {a} ∪B, constructing ¯nite sets:
{a, b, c, d} = a :: (b :: (c :: (d :: ∅)))
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory permits limited comprehension. By the separation axiom,
the set Collect(A,P) forms the set of all x ∈ A that satisfy P (x). By the replacement
axiom, the set Replace(f,A) forms the set of all f(x) for x ∈ A. There are notations for
three kinds of comprehension: separation, replacement, and both together.
Isabelle notation expansion standard notation
[ x || x:A, P (x) ] Collect(A,P) {x ∈ A | P [x]}
[ f(x) || x:A ] Replace(f,A) {f [x] | x ∈ A}
[ f(x) || x:A,P (x) ] Replace(f,Collect(A,P)) {f [x] | x ∈ A ∧ P [x]}
Because selection and replacement are axiom schemes, there is no ¯nite axiom system
for Zermelo-Fraenkel. Isabelle can formalize axiom schemes using function variables:
a: Collect(A,P) == a:A & P(a)
c: Replace(f,B) == EXISTS a. a:B & c=f(a)
Besides 2-place union and intersection (A∪B and A∩B) we have `big union' and `big
intersection' operators (
⋃
C and
⋂
C). These operate on a set of sets;
⋃
C can also be
written
⋃
A∈C A. Of these operators only `big union' is primitive. Here are the axioms for
union and intersection.
A: Union(C) == EXISTS B. A:B & B:C
a Un b == Union({a,b})
Inter(C) == [ x || x: Union(C), ALL y. y:C --> x:y ]
a Int b == [ x || x:a, x:b ]
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Since some of the axioms are unnatural, Isabelle provides derived rules for set theory.
Here are a pair of rules for comprehension. For example, if a ∈ {x ∈ A | P [x]} then both
a ∈ A and P (a) hold.
[| $H |- $E, a:A, $F |] ==> [| $H |- $E, P(a), $F |] ==>
[| $H |- $E, a: Collect(A,P), $F |]
[| $H, a: A, P(a), $G |- $E |] ==>
[| $H, a: Collect(A,P), $G |- $E |]
Here are rules for the subset relation. To show A ⊆ B, show that if x ∈ A then x ∈ B
for arbitrary x.
(!(x)[| $H, x:A |- $E, x:B, $F |]) ==> [| $H |- $E, A <= B, $F |]
[| $H, $G |- $E, c:A |] ==> [| $H, c:B, $G |- $E |] ==>
[| $H, A <= B, $G |- $E |]
There are about 60 examples. Many are proved automatically, like this one:
[| |- C<=A <-> (A Int B) Un C = A Int (B Un C) |]
Proofs about `big intersection' tend to be complicated because
⋂
is ill-behaved on the
empty set. Two interesting examples are
[| |- Inter(A Un B) = Inter(A) Int Inter(B), A<=0, B<=0 |]
[| ~(C<=0) |- Inter([ A(x) Int B(x) || x:C ]) =
Inter([ A(x) || x:C ]) Int Inter([ B(x) || x:C ]) |]
In traditional notation these are
A 6= ∅ ∧B 6= ∅ ⊃
⋂
(A ∪B) = (
⋂
A) ∩ (
⋂
B)
C 6= ∅ ⊃
⋂
x∈C
(A(x) ∩B(x)) = (
⋂
x∈C
A(x)) ∩ (
⋂
x∈C
B(x))
These proofs require complicated tactics.
Another large example justi¯es the standard de¯nition of pairing:
〈a, b〉 = {{a}, {a, b}}
It proves that 〈a, b〉 = 〈c, d〉 implies a = c and b = d. If you think this looks easy, try
proving it yourself. The Isabelle proof involves a long series of lemmas.
11 Conclusions
It is too early to tell whether Isabelle can compete with specialized systems like Nuprl
and hol in large proofs. However, people are experimenting with Isabelle at a number of
sites. There are some results to report.
Philippe NoÄel, working in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, has developed the foundations
of ¯xedpoint theory, including some elementary domain constructions. These proofs con-
tain an enormous amount of detail, for while set theory is universal, its representation
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of functions and relations is cumbersome. Perhaps set theory is not a practical formal
system; at the very least, it requires a more sophisticated proof procedure.
Tobias Nipkow (1989), using logic programming ideas, has implemented a family of
rewriting tactics in Isabelle. They resemble tactics provided with Constructive Type
Theory but are more powerful. For example, they permit matching under commutative
or associative operators. As usual, these tactics are much slower than the algorithms of
specialized rewrite rule theorem provers. Their advantages are correctness, simplicity, and
applicability in a range of logics. Nipkow (1989) illustrates them through proofs about
arithmetic.
The computer is a wonderful experimental tool. Isabelle was not designed; it evolved.
Not everyone likes this idea. Speci¯cation experts rightly abhor trial-and-error program-
ming. They suggest that no one should write a program without ¯rst writing a complete
formal speci¯cation. But university departments are not software houses. Programs like
Isabelle are not products: when they have served their purpose, they are discarded.
Isabelle's user interface is no advance over lcf's, which is widely condemned as `user-
unfriendly': hard to use, bewildering to beginners. Hence the interest in proof editors,
where a proof can be constructed and modi¯ed rule-by-rule using windows, mouse, and
menus. But Edinburgh lcf was invented because real proofs require millions of inferences.
Sophisticated tools | rules, tactics and tacticals, the language ml, the logics themselves
| are hard to learn, yet they are essential. We may demand a mouse, but we need better
education and training.
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